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FOREWORD

WHITHER CIVIC VIRTUE?
WALTER F. PRATr, JR.*

This issue is the White Center's contribution to the bicentennial of the United States Constitution. Reflecting its purpose, the Center invited contributors to explore the normative
bases for the American constitutional structure. A particular
question was whether, for any generation of Americans, a consensus on normative matters is essential for the success and
legitimacy of constitutional government. In response, the
authors of the papers published here reflected the pragmatic
concerns of the drafters of the Constitution when they took the
invitation as asking, in the words of Professor Berns, "Will [this
Constitution] work regardless of the sort of people we are or
become?"' With a shared inter-generational perspective, the
authors looked across the history of our nation to find in the
past, and particularly in the founding generation, instruction
for the United States in 1989. There should be no surprise in
their lack of agreement on the lessons to be learned from the
past-the White Center, after all, strove to present diverse
views. There may, however, be surprise in the almost uniform
agreement that the government or at least the citizenry of the
United States today lacks the virtue once thought essential for
the Constitution to endure. Thus the occasion of observing the
continuity of the Constitution is, paradoxically, also the occasion for marking its decline.
The contributors approached their subjects with a common view that the American polity is losing its fight with what
Senator Stevenson styles the "different spirits" that are relent*
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lessly in contention "for America's soul." ' 2 Even though Pastor
Neuhaus admonishes that we can despair only on Tuesdays and
Thursdays,' these authors are almost uniformly melancholy
about the present at least as compared with the era of the
founding. With varying emphasis, they decry the absence from
our public debate of a consensus even about the importance of
morals, much less about morals themselves. Stevenson sees
the nation as being in a "mid-life crisis." 4 Neuhaus reports that
we have descended to a point where the "ought" has been dismissed from our public debate.5 He warns, most strikingly,
that "[i]n the guise of technological breakthrough, but actually
representing cultural and moral breakdowns, we are witnessing
a return of eugenics. '"6 Berns finds that the past forty years
have witnessed institutional failures so that "[w]e have become
a society ridden with judicially created rights." 7 The
McDonalds are the most pessimistic of all. They conclude their
survey of American constitutional development by suggesting
that were Benjamin Franklin alive in 1989 his description of the
government would be, "[a] republic... but you will not be able
to keep it. '"8

Beyond the common approach and the shared dismay over
the current state of American politics, the authors have markedly different perspectives as they describe the nation's fall
over the past two centuries. To be sure, the papers reflect a
diversity of expertise. But there is more to the differences than
the mere chance of intellectual predisposition. The differences
reflect profound, though elusive, disagreement about the
proper sphere for governmental activity. As the authors seek
to identify the cause or the nature of the change in American
society they point to the failing of either institutions or people.
These authors thereby manifest a divergence of thought which
has existed since the founding. Yet again there is the paradox:
if the differences have existed for two centuries, how can it be
that consensus on normative issues is ever required?
2. Stevenson, Is It Time to Reform the Reforms?, 4 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 63, 66 (1989).
3. Neuhaus, The Moral Delegitimization of Law, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS

& PUB. POL'y 51, 59 (1989).
4. Stevenson, supra note 2, at 65.
5.

6.
7.
8.
NOTRE

Neuhaus, supra note 3, at 55.

Id. at 59.
Berns, supra note 1, at 34.
McDonald & McDonald, A Republic, Madam, If You Can Keep It, 4
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7, 21 (1989).
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The McDonalds set the stage by describing two different
versions of republicanism which coalesced to form the Constitution. From New England came puritanical republicanism,
which "sought moral solutions" and "sought to make better
people." 9 By contrast, the agrarian republicans from the South
"believed in making better political arrangements."' 0 For the
puritanical republicans, religion was a matter of great concern,
as the McDonalds evidence with a quotation from John Adams
explaining that republican government "could be supported
only 'by pure Religion or Austere Morals. Public Virtue cannot
exist in a Nation without private [virtue].' "" The contrasting
causal sequence for agrarian republicans began with ownership
of land, which produced independence, which produced virtue,
which produced republican liberty.' 2 What the New England
republicans saw as laws designed to make better people (and
consequently
better government) the Southerners saw as
3
tyranny. '

The continuity of the Southern agrarian tradition is manifest in the articles by Stevenson and Berns, both of whom see
institutions and laws as the defenders of the virtue of society.
"America's Constitution is the product of [a] political science,"
Berns explains, that "has nothing to say about civic education
but, instead, employs new or perfected institutions-the separation or distribution of powers, checks and balances, representation, an independent judiciary-to resolve the persistent
political problems, institutions that work only within the
extended territory that is the United States."' 4 Berns contends
that these institutions, and especially the judiciary, have failed
to preserve the representative branch as the sole institution
where compromise can prevail to prevent conflict over "great
causes" from destroying the government.' 5 In place of the
accommodation inherent in representative bodies, the courts
have created a government of rights-rights which, by definition, are not subject to compromise.16 Stevenson also argues,
even confesses, that too great an emphasis has been placed on
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id.
11. Id.at 11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.at 13; cf. Berns, supra note 1,at 26-27 on property.
Compare McDonald & McDonald, supra note 8, at 11, 14.
Berns, supra note 1, at 26. See also id. at 26-27 on mercantilism.

15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. at 24.
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individual rights. But he locates the failure in the representative branch itself.' 7 In fact, according to Stevenson, the failure
is the result of reforms which made the electoral process too
inclusive 8-an echo of the fears of too much democracy which
drove the founders to draft the Constitution two centuries ago.
While Berns and Stevenson restate portions of the Southern agrarian tradition, Neuhaus offers a revised interpretation
of New England republicanism. He appears to share Berns's
(and Stevenson's as well) fondness for a politics of discussion
and debate. But Neuhaus differs significantly in the central
place he finds for religion in that debate. For Neuhaus, as for
the New Englanders of the late eighteenth century, the American constitutional structure cannot succeed "without a radical
dependence upon public virtue, and public virtue's radical
dependence, in turn, upon religion."' 9 In another part of his
remarks, he states his thesis in a sequence which reveals the
stark contrast between him and the Southern agrarian tradition: "Law is a function of politics; politics, a function of culture; and culture, a function of religion. All are required if we
are truly to engage in that exercise which is the asking of one
another, and the arguing with one another over, how we ought
to order our life together." 20 Neuhaus's disagreement with
Berns is evident from his critique of contemporary politics
where
the ought is dismissed, if not as meaningless, then as
capable of being given meaningful answers only in the
personal and private sphere, hermetically sealed off to
keep from disrupting our public business in a way that
might lead to impassioned conflicts over conflicting
moralities, and maybe even to religious warfare. 2 '
Neuhaus is critical of any version of the American experiment which is premised on an understanding of public virtue
which the "state has no business to control or to define."' 22 By
contrast, Berns seems to support the contention that the
authority of government "does not extend to the care of
souls." ' 23

Neuhaus calls for a restoration of "pluralism in

American life." ' 24 The result of such a restoration is unclear.
17.
18.

Stevenson, supra note 2, at 69.
Id. at 66-67.

19.

Neuhaus, supra note 3, at 55.

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 60-61.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.

23.
24.

Berns, supra note 1, at 28.
Neuhaus, supra note 3, at 56.
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Possibly he would favor "impassioned conflicts over conflicting
moralities," but surely not "religious warfare." 5
Although the authors reflect the division that separated the
members of the founding generation, they lack the shared
incentive for agreement on a conclusion. To the extent that
they imply that shared religious beliefs is essential, they confront the elusive nature of religion itself. Berns poses the problem in a question: "Who, then, is Nature's God, the god who is
said to have endowed us with out rights .. .:the old God or
some new god; the Biblical God or the god who reveals himself
only in the order of the universe?" 6 The religion which Neuhaus says is at the foundation of government is "religion as a
functional phenomenon.., that which is binding in terms of a
set of ideas and beliefs in a society, civilization, or tradition. "27
Yet religion in that "sociological frame of reference 28 is so
broad as to almost certainly lead to what Professor Pangle
found Jefferson to anticipate: "the tepid and thoughtless uniformity of unitarianism. "29 But Neuhaus anticipates the objection and challenges us to avoid surrendering to clich6s. He
concedes that the task is difficult but argues that difficulty is no
excuse for abdication.3 °
The recurring effort to identify religious virtue with the
"civic virtue" said to be essential to a republican government is
clearly fraught with the same difficulties. Pangle points to
Montesquieu as saying that "the 'virtue' which sustains a
democracy has nothing to do with Christian virtue."13 1 Instead,
"'virtue, in a republic, is the love of one's country, that is, the
love of equality. It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but apolitical
virtue.' "32 In more nearly contemporaneous phrasing, this virtue is nothing other than following President Kennedy's inaugural challenge: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask
what you can do for your country." The problem thus risks
being reduced to a tautology. If civic virtue is required for a
society to continue and if virtue is nothing other than a commitment to the society then virtue and society are identical. If
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 55.
Berns, supra note 1, at 25.
Neuhaus, supra note 3, at 52-53.
Id. at 52.
Pangle, Religion inthe Thought of Some of the Leading American Founders, 4

NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37, 45 (1989).

30.
31.
32.

Neuhaus, supra note 3, at 55.
Pangle, supra note 29, at 38.
Id.
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individual members have no dedication to the society, there is
no society, only atomistic units.
But the contributors do not leave us in such a definitional
quagmire. True, they do not agree on answers to the fundamental questions posed by the White Center. But they do
point toward an agreement, an implicit consensus, which does
seem to be a requisite for the existence of a republic. And, as
with so many questions in our national political life, Jefferson
saw the answer from the start: "The only genuine truth, or
objective validity, religion can evince is its tolerance ....
Thus, one might well conclude from these papers that it is
not civic virtue upon which the existence of constitutional government depends but civic dialogue. The task for the American
people and their government is not to ensure the virtue of the
citizenry. Instead, the task is to ensure that the public dialogue
remains sufficiently civil to enable the compromises which
these authors show are essential to the successful evolution of
government to meet the different needs of each new
generation.

33.

Id. at 46.

